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Abstract
We consider a Ramsey model with a continuum of Cournotian industries where free
entry generates an endogenous markup. The model produces two different regimes,
monopoly and oligopoly, resulting in non-smooth dynamics. We analyze the global
dynamics of the model, demonstrating the model may exhibit heteroclinic orbits con-
necting multiple equilibria. Small transitory changes in parameters can lead to large
permanent effects and there can be a Rostovian poverty trap separating a low-capital
and high-markup equilibrium from a high-capital low-markup equilibrium. The paper
applies recent results from applied mathematics for non-smooth dynamic systems.
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1 Introduction.
Traditionally, the study of differential equations has been based on the assumption of con-
tinuous differentiability of at least the first and second order, resulting in smooth dynamics.
Furthermore, in economics most dynamic systems are restricted to a unique stable steady-
state equilibrium. In this paper, we take the analysis of dynamic systems in economics
beyond both of these boundaries in developing a model of entry in Cournot product mar-
kets (resulting in an endogenous markup) in a dynamic general equilibrium continuous time
Ramsey model. Cournot competition has the attraction that increases in economic activity
are associated with more firms and hence lower markups, which captures the empirical fea-
ture of counter-cyclical markups - see inter alia Martins and Scarpetta (2002). We embed
this entry process into an otherwise fairly standard intertemporal representative-household
macromodel. The Ramsey household consumes and accumulates capital. Free entry drives
profits in each instant to zero, leading to an endogenous markup and hence a wedge between
the marginal product and the marginal revenue os capital. We apply recent advances in
applied mathematics ( Leine (2006), di Bernardo et al. (2008)) which extend traditional
analysis to allow for non-smooth piecewise continuous dynamic systems. Furthermore, we
develop a comprehensive analysis of the local and global dynamics of an economic system
which possesses up to three steady-state equilibria, including up to two saddle-path stable
equilibria, and perform the corresponding bifurcation analysis.
Whilst there are several papers that have explored the relationship between entry and
the resultant ”endogenous markups” using the Cournot model, most have done so in the
context of discrete-time frameworks either in an OLG environment as in Chatterjee et al.
(1993), D’Aspremont et al. (1995), dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005), or Kaas
and Madden (2005), or in a unique steady-state Real Business Cycle (RBC) setting as in
dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006), Portier (1995), Costa (2001) and Costa (2006).
Continuous-time models of endogenous growth have also employed the Cournot mechanism
for endogenizing markups - Zilibotti (1994), Gal´ı and Zilibotti (1995). Related to the
Cournotian approach of this paper is the Linneman (2001) model of entry in monopolistic
competition as used in Jaimovich (2007) and Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008), and Bilbiie
et al. (2007). Entry reduces the market share of firms, and hence reduces the ”own price
effect” of the monopolist on the aggregate price index, which increases the elasticity of
demand (see Yang and Heidra (1993))1.
Whilst we allow for entry and exit, we place a lower bound on the measure of firms at
unity. This eliminates the undesirable property of Cournot entry that the markup can go to
unity and hence the marginal revenue product of capital to zero as the ”number” of firms
gets below unity and falls towards zero2. In a symmetric Cournot equilibrium, the firm’s
1Other papers that consider a variety of aggregate feedback mechanisms are D’Aspremont et al. (1989),
Wu and Zhang (2000).
2Recall, that in most economic analysis, the industry elasticitiy of demand σ is assumed to be elastic, so
that σ > 1
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elasticity of demand is the product of the number of firms n and the industry elasticity σ, nσ
hence when n = 1/σ, the firm’s elasticity is unity so that the equilibrium output is zero and
the economy ceases to produce output or accumulate capital3. Whilst placing a lower bound
on the number of firms in an industry avoids this absurd outcome, it creates a discontinuity
in the dynamic system, since when the number of firms falls to one, the markup remains
constant at σ, and the number of industries shrinks. The typical industry in the economy
can thus be in one of two states: monopoly, where there is only one firm producing each good
and charging the monopoly markup, or oligopoly where there is more than one firm and the
markup is below its monopoly ceiling. These two states result in two dynamic regimes for the
economy: for low levels of capital the dynamics is in the monopoly regime, for high levels
it is in the oligopoly regime, and in-between there is a switching boundary and resultant
non-smooth dynamics.
We find that there can be one, two or three steady-state equilibria in this economy. There
are two types of stable equilibria (saddles): one is a low-output high-markup monopoly; the
other is a high-output low-markup oligopoly. All other types of equilibria are locally unstable.
We analyze the global dynamics of the model, which is non-trivial in a multiple-equilibrium
environment, demonstrating the model exhibits robust heteroclinic orbits, i.e. orbits that
connect the different equilibria together, and we do it in both the smooth and non-smooth
cases (depending on whether the orbit passes through the switching boundary). Furthermore,
we show how two fundamentally similar economies may behave very differently, as they may
be in two different regimes with distinct dynamic behavior, especially in terms of markups.
Even for the same economy, there is the possibility of regime change along the convergence
to a stable long-run equilibrium if the switching boundary is passed. From the bifurcation
analysis, the ”deep” parameters associated with the dominant market structure (fixed costs
and the elasticity of demand) play a crucial role in this model and a change in their values
may alter the dynamics in a radical way, either by inducing a discontinuous transition or a
discontinuous hysteresis. A transitory (and possibly small) technology shock can give rise to
a large permanent shift in the equilibrium. If the shock takes the economy from the initial
equilibrium across the switching boundary, the economy can amplify the initial shock and
lead the economy (through capital accumulation) to the alternative stable equilibrium.
This economy can display a ”Rostovian” threshold effect, or ”poverty trap” (Easterly
(2006)). Unless the economy starts off with a high enough capital stock, it will be trapped
in the low-output high-markup monopoly. If, however, the capital stock is high enough, the
economy will be attracted to the high-output low-markup equilibrium. The dividing line
is (for a range of parameters) a totally unstable equilibrium, i.e. an unstable focus. The
implication of this threshold effect is that an economy may be stuck in a monopoly with
a high markup, which reduces the marginal revenue product of capital below its marginal
product, and discourages saving so that only a low steady-state capital emerges. This would
make a good argument for the government to intervene in some way to enable a great leap
3See for example Gal´ı and Zilibotti (1995) who define this case as ”autarky”.
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forward to achieve the critical capital stock so that it can then leave the outcome to the
market. This intervention could take the form of regulation (reducing the gap between the
marginal product of capital and the return to savings), the encouragement of savings and
the accumulation of capital4.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we introduce the basic Ramsey model with
capital accumulation and entry a´ la Cournot. In section 3, we explore in detail the switching
boundary and the dynamics in the two regions: monopolistic and Cournot. In section 4 we
characterize the steady-state equilibrium, perform the bifurcation analysis, and determine
the local dynamics of the equilibria. In section 5, we characterize the global dynamics of
our general-equilibrium system. Section 6 analyses the long-run effects of technology shocks
leading to permanent regime changes, section 7 concludes.
2 A Ramsey Model with Endogenous Markups.
We assume there is a single infinitely living household that consumes a basket of goods and
supplies one unit of labor and K units of capital to firms. Total population is constant, it
was normalized to unity, and we assume that the rate of technical progress is zero5. Thus,
quantity variables may be interpreted as expressed in units of efficient labor. The household
is assumed to maximize an intertemporal utility function in the absence of uncertainty:
max
C(t)
U =
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt lnC (t) dt,
where ρ > 0 represents the rate of time preference and C stands for consumption. For sake
of simplicity we assume a logarithmic felicity function, but most results hold with a general
isoelastic function.
The final good can be used either for consumption or for capital accumulation and its price
is normalized to unity, i.e. the final good is used as nume´raire. Therefore, the instantaneous
budget constraint is given by
K˙ (t) = w (t) +R (t)K (t) + Π (t)− C (t)− δK(t), (1)
where w is the wage rate, R stands for the rental price of capital, Π represents pure profits,
and δ > 0 is the capital depreciation rate.
Optimal consumption and labor supply paths verify the Euler and the transversality
conditions:
C˙ (t)
C (t)
= R (t)− (ρ+ δ) , (2)
4More radical alternatives would be forced saving or the nationalization of the means of production in
the initial stages of development.
5This is for simplicity. Exogenous population growth or exogenous technical progress do not change the
main message of the model, but it complicates notation substantially.
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lim
t→∞
e−ρt
K (t)
C (t)
= 0. (3)
2.1 The final-good sector
The final good sector is perfectly competitive, with the representative firm maximizing its
profits given by
max
Y (t),[y(v,t)]
z(t)
v=0
Y (t)−
∫ z(t)
0
p (v, t) y (v, t) dv,
where Y (t) is the production of final good, y(v, t) and p (v, t) stand for intermediate con-
sumption of variety v ∈ [0, z(t)] at the moment t, and for its relative price, and z(t) is the
mass of the continuum of intermediate goods. Profit maximization is subject to a constant
returns to specialization6 CES technology that transforms a continuum of intermediate goods
into a homogenous final good:
Y (t) = z (t)
1
1−σ
[∫ z(t)
0
y (v, t)
σ−1
σ dv
] σ
σ−1
,
where σ > 1 represents the elasticity of substitution between inputs.
The first-order conditions lead to the demand function for each input and also to
y (v, t) = p (v, t)−σ
Y (t)
z (t)
, (4)
and
1 =
(
1
z (t)
∫ z(t)
0
p (v, t)1−σ dv
) 1
1−σ
, (5)
where the left-hand side represents the price and the right-hand side is the marginal cost of
producing it.
The market-clearing condition for this sector is given by Y (t) = C (t) + I (t) where
I (t) = K˙ (t) + δK (t) is the gross investment defined as I (t) = K˙ (t) + δK (t).
2.2 The intermediate goods sector.
First, we assume 0 < z (t) ≤ 1, i.e. the mass of the continuum of intermediate goods,
is bounded above by one, a fixed technological frontier. Industry V that produces good
v ∈ [0, z(t)] is composed of n(v, t) ≥ 1 producers at moment t7. Each industry can be in
6That is, there is no ”love of variety” and the range of intermediate goods has no effect per se on unit
cost.
7Of course this number is an integer. However, we will treat it as a real number, for simplicity. We can
think about it as the average number of firms in each industry.
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one of two states: monopoly, when only one firm is operative, or oligopoly, when more than
one is operative. New firms prefer to be monopolists than to share existing industries.
When monopoly profit opportunities are still available, i.e. 0 < z (t) < 1, new firms will
set up as monopolies. Only when all industries have at least one firm operating z (t) = 1,
will new firms be forced to enter existing oligopolistic industries. Using the terminology in
D’Aspremont et al. (1997), we assume Cournotian Monopolistic Competition (CMC), i.e.
firms choose quantity to influence their own market price (as in Cournot), but treat the
aggregate price level as given (as in monopolistic competition).
The representative firm i ∈ {1, ..., n(v, t)}, in industry V , maximizes its real profits given
by
max
yi(v,t),Li(v,t),Ki(v,t)
Πi (v, t) = p (v, t) yi (v, t)− w (t)Li (v, t)− R (t)Ki (v, t) , (6)
where yi represents the output of firm i, Ki and Li represent its capital and labor inputs.
The production technology is given by the following expression valid for yi > 0:
yi (v, t) + φ = A (t)Ki (v, t)
α L(v, t)1−α, (7)
where A (t) > 0 stands for total factor productivity (TFP), 0 < α < 1, and φ > 0 induces
increasing returns to scale. Firm i also faces the following inverse residual demand for its
variety, given the outputs of the other firms in industry V (k 6= i ∈ V ) and given the prices
of firms producing goods that are an imperfect substitute to good v,
p (v, t) =

z (t)
yi (v, t) +
∑
k 6=i∈V
yk (v, t)
Y (t)


− 1
σ
. (8)
Notice this is a static problem, as the firm does not accumulate capital. The first-order
conditions are given by
(1− µi (v, t)) (1− α)A (t)
(
Ki (v, t)
Li (v, t)
)α
=
w (t)
p (v, t)
, (9)
(1− µi (v, t))αA (t)
(
Ki (v, t)
Li (v, t)
)α−1
=
R (t)
p (v, t)
, (10)
where µi(v, t) = yi (v, t) /
(
σ
∑
s∈V
ys (v, t)
)
∈ (0, 1) is the Lerner index for firm i in industry V .
Henceforth we will call this market-power measure the ”markup”. Observe that if industry
V is a monopoly, i.e. n(v, t) = 1, then the markup is µ(v, t) = 1/σ, and if industry V is a
oligopoly, i.e. n(v, t) > 1, then 0 < µ(v, t) < 1/σ.
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2.3 Symmetric equilibrium and aggregation.
Considering an inter-industrial symmetric equilibrium, we have n (v, t) = n (t); and within-
industry symmetry implies8 µi(v, t) = µ(t) = 1/ (σn(t)) and p (v, t) = 1.
The market-clearing condition for the labor market is given by L(t) = 1. The market-
clearing condition in the final good market, Y (t) = D(t), allows us to derive an aggregate
production function for final output
Y = F (K)− znφ, (11)
where F (K) = AKα is a reduced-form production function for ”gross” output. Capital
market clearing generates the rate of return of capital
R = (1− µ)F ′(K). (12)
Profit income is obtained by aggregating profits across all firms in the economy, i.e.
Π = Y − w − RK. Considering the equilibrium factor prices and the aggregate production
function, total profits can be expressed as
Π = µF (K)− znφ. (13)
2.4 Entry, endogenous markups, and regime switching
In the absence of sunk entry costs there will be instantaneous free entry, i.e. wither the
continuum of intermediate goods (z) or the number of firms in each industry (n) adjust in
order to keep pure profits of all firms firm equal to zero, i.e. Π = 0.
Together, equations (11), (13), and the zero-profit condition imply that the reduced-form
production function becomes9
Y = (1− µ)F (K) , (14)
and the aggregate resource constraint of the economy, at the equilibrium is
K˙ = (1− µ)F (K)− C − δK. (15)
Up to this point the type of entry is undefined. Given the assumptions made, the incentive
scheme in the economy separates entry into two regimes and a regime-switch transition:
1. there is a Monopolistic-Competition (MC) regime when n = 1 and the only possibility
for an entrant is to start a new industry, i.e. entry determines the equilibrium value of
z ∈ (0, 1), as vertical entry can only take place for z < 1;
8Note that since σ > 1 and n ≥ 1, µ(t) < 1.
9Equation (14) does not depend on the specific functional form assumed in equation (7). In fact, the same
result is obtained for a general linear-homogeneous production function for ”gross” output: yi (v, t) + φ =
f (Ki (v, t) , L(v, t)).
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2. there is a CMC regime when z = 1 and entry can only take place into existing indus-
tries, i.e. horizontal entry determines the number of firms in the industry n, such that
n > 1;
3. there is a regime-switch frontier if and only if z = n = 1, that is the case in which
new industries cannot be created and there is place for exactly one producer in each
industry.
Although we treat n as a continuous variable, we still want to impose a lower bound of
n ≥ 1, so that the markup cannot take a value greater than 1/σ, the level attained in the
MC regime. Without this restriction, the economy would possess a ”black hole” where as
n falls towards 1/σ < 1 the markup rises to unity and wages and the return on capital go
to zero along with output and consumption. Setting the lower bound at 1 seems to us a
reasonable way of avoiding this exotic and implausible phenomenon (any lower bound above
1/σ would do).
It turns out that both the markup and the regime we are in becomes endogenous and
depend on the (current) capital stock. Taking into account that n = 1/ (σµ), we obtain the
rule governing the endogenous mark-up: the actual markup µ = µ(K) is the smaller of the
free-entry MC (n = 1) markup given by 1/σ and its CMC (z = 1) counterpart given by
m(K) = (σF (K) /φ)−1/2,10
µ = µ(K) = min {1/σ,m(K)} . (16)
Then, there is a critical value for capital for which a regime switch occurs: the capital
stock for which entry reduces the number of firms per industry to exactly one in the CMC
regime and induces a mass of the continuum of varieties equal to its maximum (i.e. one) in
the MC regime. Equation (16) allow us to define it as K˜ ≡ { K : m(K) = 1/σ}. Given the
Cobb-Douglas production function in equation (7), the critical level for the capital stock is
given by
K˜ =
(
φσ
A
)1/α
> 0. (17)
If 0 < K < K˜ then the economy operates in a MC regime and if K > K˜ then the economy
operates in a CMC regime11. Poor economies tend to operate at the MC regime and rich
10See dos Santos Ferreira and Lloyd-Braga (2005), equation (15), p. 852 for a similar equation to µ =
m (K). Gal´ı and Zilibotti (1995), equation (8), p. 201 is equivalent to µ = m (K) when the marginal product
of labour is constant (they assume an AK model). dos Santos Ferreira and Dufourt (2006), equation (7), p.
316 is a partial equilibrium version. Costa (2004), equation (25), p. 65 is equivalent to the one presented
here.
11Given that m(K) is positive, monotonous and has limK→0m(K) = +∞, limK→∞m(K) = 0, then
K˜ ≡ {K : m(K) = 1/σ} is unique. Therefore: (1) for all K in the interval (0, K˜) we have m(K) > 1/σ
which implies µ = min{m(K), 1/σ} = 1/σ, and (2) for all K in the interval in the interval (K˜,+∞) we
have m(K) < 1/σ which implies µ = min{m(K), 1/σ} = m(K).
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economies in the CMC regime. Regime switches may occur in two different ways. First, if
the capital stock is far away from its steady state and along the transition it passes through
K˜, triggering an endogenous change in the regime. Second, if the economy is in a steady
state and a shock to parametersα, φ, σ, or A occurs, moving it to a different regime.
2.5 Global production and return functions
Given that the critical value K˜ defines a switching boundary, the endogenous markup func-
tion given by equation (16) has two contiguous branches. Thus, the aggregate production
function in (14) and the rate of return on capital in (12) also exhibit two contiguous branches:
Y (K) =
{
Y1(K) ≡ (1−
1
σ
)F (K) if 0 ≤ K ≤ K˜,
Y2(K) ≡ (1−m(K))F (K) if K ≥ K˜,
(18)
and
R(K) =
{
R1(K) ≡ (1−
1
σ
)F
′
(K) if 0 ≤ K ≤ K˜,
R2(K) ≡ (1−m(K))F
′
(K) if K ≥ K˜.
(19)
The first branch in both functions corresponds to the MC regime and the second cor-
responds to the CMC regime. Next we will characterize the properties of the aggregate
technology and return on capital arising from those functions.
At K = K˜ both production and return functions are continuous, because
R1(K˜) = R2(K˜) = R˜ = α(σ − 1)(A/σ)K˜
α−1
Y1(K˜) = Y2(K˜) = Y˜ = (σ − 1)(A/σ)K˜
α,
but classic derivatives do not exist. However, we can determine generalized gradients for the
production function as
∂Y (K) =


Y
′
1 (K) if 0 ≤ K < K˜,
∂Y (K˜) if K = K˜,
Y
′
2 (K) if K > K˜.
(20)
where ∂Y (K˜) is the convex hull of Y
′
1 (K) and Y
′
2 (K) at K = K˜, ∂Y (K˜) = { (1− q)Y
′
1 (K˜)+
qY
′
2 (K˜) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1}, and for the return function
∂R(K) =


R
′
1(K) if 0 ≤ K < K˜,
∂R(K˜) if K = K˜,
R
′
2(K) if K > K˜,
(21)
where ∂R(K˜) is the convex hull of R
′
1(K) and R
′
2(K) at K = K˜, ∂R(K˜) = { (1−q)R
′
1(K˜)+
qR
′
2(K˜) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1}.
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Lemma 1. Functions Y (K) and R(K) are continuous and piecewise smooth (PWS).
All proofs are in the appendix. Next we observe that the concavity of both functions
depend critically on the elasticity of intermediate input substitution, σ. Let us define
σ¯ = σ¯(α) =
2− α
2(1− α)
> 1, (22)
an admissible value for σ considering σ¯ > 1 for all 0 < α < 1.
Lemma 2 Let K¯ ≡ (σ¯/σ)2/α K˜. (a) If the elasticity of substitution between inputs is large,
i.e. for σ > σ¯, then the technology is concave in a generalized way, i.e. ∂2Y (K) ∈ R−−,
and there are decreasing returns, i.e. ∂R(K) ∈ R−−. (b) If max{1, σ¯/2} < σ < σ¯ then
the production function is concave and the return function is non-monotonous: R2(K)
is increasing for K ∈ [K˜, K¯), reaches a local maximum at K = K¯, and it is decreasing
for K > K¯. (c) If 1 < σ < max{1, σ¯/2} then the return function has the same
properties as in (b) but the production function becomes concave-convex: Y2(K) is
locally convex for K ∈ [K˜, K¯), reaches a local maximum at K = K¯, and it is locally
concave for K > K¯. 12
Figures 1 and 2 below depict the first two (more plausible) cases in which the production
function is concave, i.e. for σ > σ¯, and the case in which the return function may be locally
increasing, at the onset of the CMC regime, and the production function is concave.
Figure 1 around here
Figure 2 around here
The existence of two regimes has interesting economic implications. First, the firm-level
production technology is one corresponding to ”natural monopoly” since there is a globally
decreasing average cost when φ > 0 with constant marginal cost. The degree of inefficiency
can be proxied by the gap between average cost ( ac) and marginal cost (mc). In both MC
and CMC regimes free entry implies that price equals average cost p = ac (zero profits) and
industry equilibrium implies marginal revenue equals marginal cost p(1− 1/(nσ)) : hence
ac
mc
=
(
1−
1
nσ
)
.
In the MC regime where n = 1, this gap is fixed and hence output per-firm is tied down.
In the CMC regime, however, matters are different because n increases with K, n =
(σφ/F (K))−1/2. More firms means a lower markup, which narrows the gap between ac
12The third case, is somewhat uninteresting, as we can only obtain 1 < σ¯/2 for α > 2/3.
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and mc, as the zero-profit condition requires output per firm to increase. In the limit as K
(and hence n) tend to infinity, ac tends to mc, and output per firm also tends to infinity,
the condition for efficient production.
The possibility of a concave-convex technology relates to an existing literature: Skiba
(1978) and Dechert and Nishimura (1983). However, these contributions were made for
centralized economies in which the externalities are fully internalized. Therefore, the return
and the marginal product of capital are permanently equalized. In our model we retain some
of the dynamic properties of that type of model (e.g. the existence of multiple stationary
equilibria) while circumventing criticisms that those functions are ad-hoc. In addition, when
utility is logarithmic, the general equilibrium is Markovian in contrast to those models - see
Santos (2002) (see below).
3 General Equilibrium.
Definition: General Equilibrium. The general equilibrium (GE) is defined by the paths
for the mass of industries and for the number firms per industry, [(z(t), n(t))]∞t=0, by
the allocations and prices [([y(v, t)]v∈(0,z(t)], [p(v, t)]v∈(0,z(t)])]
∞
t=0, and by the aggregate
capital stock and consumption trajectories
[(K(t), C(t))]∞t=0 such that both final- and intermediate-goods firms and consumers
optimize, there is symmetric equilibria in all markets for intermediate goods, and the
equilibrium conditions for both factor and final-good markets hold.
In the previous section, we proved that in a symmetric equilibrium, the paths of z, n,
and of the distributions [y(v)] and [p(v)] depend on the paths of the aggregate capital stock
K, and the last one is jointly determined with the trajectory of aggregate consumption C
at the GE level. As R(K) and Y (K) are defined by the PWS continuous functions (18) and
(19) the GE paths are generated by a dynamic system that also displays discontinuities.
Let us define the following subsets of (K,C) ∈ R2+:
S1 = { (K,C) ∈ R
2
+ : m(K) > 1/σ} = { (K,C) ∈ R
2
+ : 0 ≤ K < K˜}, (23)
Σ = { (K,C) ∈ R2+ : m(K) = 1/σ} = { (K,C) ∈ R
2
+ : K = K˜}, (24)
S2 = { (K,C) ∈ R
2
+ : m(K) < 1/σ} = { (K,C) ∈ R
2
+ : K > K˜}, (25)
where S1 (S2) corresponds to states of the economy where a MC (CMC) regime is in place.
If the economy is in state Σ we say it is on the switching boundary between the previous
two regimes. We also know that S¯1 ∩ S¯2 = Σ.
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The equilibrium trajectories [(K(t), C(t))]t∈R+ are the solutions to the system
C˙ =
{
(R1(K)− (ρ+ δ))C if (K,C) ∈ S1,
(R2(K)− (ρ+ δ))C if (K,C) ∈ S2,
(26)
K˙ =
{
Y1(K)− δK − C if (K,C) ∈ S1,
Y2(K)− δK − C if (K,C) ∈ S2.
(27)
together with the initial condition K(0) = K0 and the transversality condition in (3).
Equations (26) and (27) define a PWS continuous dynamic system since: (1) both
functions are smooth in the two branches; (2) they are continuous at the boundary Σ,
as R1(K˜) = R2(K˜) and Y1(K˜) = Y2(K˜); and (3) nevertheless, their derivatives differ at
K = K˜, i.e. R
′
1(K˜) < R
′
2(K˜) and Y
′
1 (K˜) < Y
′
2 (K˜)
13. In order to understand the nature of
the dynamics of our PWS system, we have distinguish between candidate and GE paths. We
denote them as Φc(t) = (ΦcK(t,K(0)),Φ
c
C(t,K(0))) and Φ(t) = (ΦK(t,K(0)),ΦC(t,K(0)))
respectively. Candidate trajectories, are solutions to the system (26)-(27) for a given ini-
tial capital stock K(0), belonging to one of the two possible states of the economy: MC
when 0 < K(0) < K˜ (branch S1) or CMC when K(0) > K˜ (branch S2). We denote
Φcj(t) = (Φ
c
j,K(t),Φ
c
j,C(t)) and Φj(t) = (Φj,K(t),Φj,C(t)) the candidate and the GE trajecto-
ries belonging to branch Sj for j = 1, 2.
The following types of behavior are possible, starting from any initial capital stock14:
if (K(0), C (0)) ∈ Sj for j = 1, 2, with an arbitrary C(0), the solution Φ
c(t) = Φcj(t), for
t > 0, has one the following alternative types of trajectory. First, it may stay inside the
same area Sj converging to a steady state (K
∗
j , C
∗
j ) ∈ Sj , or it may converge to zero or
unbounded values for one or both variables. Alternatively, it may contact the boundary Σ
at time t = tΣ > 0 where Φ
c
j,K (tΣ, K(0)) = K˜. It was proved that for PWS continuous
systems15 four types of behavior may unfold upon contact with the switching boundary: (1)
there is a steady state located at the boundary (K˜, C˜) ∈ Σ, which is reached in infinite time
and we have Φcj(∞, K(0)) = (C
∗
Σ, K
∗
Σ); (2) the trajectory crosses the boundary and proceeds
to S−j (S−j = S1 for j = 2 and S−j = S2 for j = 1), taking the value Φ
c
−j(t,Φ
c
j(tΣ, K(0)) at
time t > tΣ and converges to a steady state (K
∗
−j, C
∗
−j) ∈ S−j to zero or unbounded values
of one or both variables; (3) the trajectory grazes the boundary and turns back inside area
Sj , converging to a steady state (K
∗
j , C
∗
j ) ∈ Sj to zero or to unbounded values of one or both
13Were the functions discontinuous at the boundary Σ, we would have a Filippov system, from Filippov
(1988). See di Bernardo et al. (2008), and Leine and Nijmeier (2004) for the state of the art on the analysis
of both types of dynamic systems. Fillipov systems have been subject to more attention. However, recent
advances in dealing with PWS continuous systems are presented in the above-mentioned references and also
in Freire et al. (1998) and Leine (2006). We will use the approach in di Bernardo et al. (2008) and di
Bernardo et al. (2008) from now on.
14It is well known in the literature that solutions exist when the vector fields are continuous, as in our
model.
15See di Bernardo et al. (2008).
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variables; (4) the trajectory crosses Σ at time tjΣ, penetrates S−j , curls back to the switching
boundary Σ at time t−jΣ > t
j
Σ, and re-enters the initial branch Sj - in this case, if t > t
−j
Σ the
candidate path takes the value Φcj(t,Φ
c
−j(t
−j
Σ ,Φ
c
j(t
j
Σ, K(0))).
GE trajectories, Φ(t), are candidate trajectories starting from a given (K(0), C(0)) ∈ Sj
such that the transversality condition holds. If the equilibrium is determinate, there is
an unique value Φj,C(0, K(0)) such that the transversality condition holds, whether that
value is not unique when indeterminacy exists. In our case this means that the trajectories
should converge to a steady state in Sj (with or without grazing the boundary Σ), in Σ or
in S−j , after traversing the boundary. If the last case occurs, the GE paths concatenate
the solutions belonging to both branches. If (K(0), C(0)) ∈ Sj then Φ(t) = Φj(t,K(0))
for t < tΣ, Φ(tΣ) = Φj(tΣ, K(0)) for t = tΣ, and Φ(t) = Φ−j(t,Φj(tΣ, K(0)), for t > tΣ.
Intuitively, this means that there is an endogenous and transient change in the regime from
MC to CMC, or vice-versa.
Thus, two possible changes in regime may occur: (1) a transient change in regime takes
place if the initial and the steady-state levels for the capital stock are located in different
sides of the switching boundary Σ and the adjustment dynamics involves traversing the
switching boundary; (2) a long-run regime shift if there is a parameter change that justifies
it.
In the next two sections, we use global-bifurcation analysis to determine what types of
GE dynamics features our model can display. We do this by characterizing the local behavior
at equilibria, the behavior at the switching boundary, and finally global dynamics.
4 Local Dynamics.
We will first examine local dynamics around the steady-states. In the last section we
presented two types of steady states that can exist in system (26)-(27): regular steady states
if they belong to the interior of Sj with j = 1, 2, (K
∗
j , C
∗
j ) ≡ {(K,C) ∈ Sj : C˙ = K˙ = 0},
and boundary steady states if they belong to Σ, (K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ) ≡ {(K,C) ∈ Σ : C˙ = K˙ = 0}. For
given values of the parameters, steady states may be isolated or multiple, and in the latter
they can belong either to the same or to different regimes.
From the properties of functions (18) and (19) we obtain the following relationship be-
tween steady-state consumption and capital stock:
C∗j = βK
∗
j , β ≡
ρ+ (1− α)δ
α
> 0, for j = 1, 2,Σ, (28)
which implies that each steady state is completely characterized using the steady-state stock
of capital, K∗j ≡ {K ∈ Sj : Rj(K) = ρ+ δ}, j = 1, 2, or K
∗
Σ = {K ∈ Σ : R1(K) = R2(K) =
ρ+ δ}, respectively for regular or boundary steady states.
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Let us define the following critical values for parameter φ:
φ˜ ≡
1
σ
(
A
(
α
ρ+ δ
(
1−
1
σ
))α)1/(1−α)
. (29)
and
φ¯ ≡
σ
σ¯2
(
A
(
α
ρ+ δ
(
1−
1
σ¯
))α)1/(1−α)
for 1 < σ ≤ σ¯. (30)
The next proposition and the bifurcation diagrams in Figure 3 summarize the local
dynamics, in the neighborhood of steady states.
Proposition 1. Local dynamics and bifurcations at steady-state equilibria.
1. If 1 < σ < σ¯ either a unique or multiple equilibria may exist, depending on φ.
For φ > φ¯ there is a unique saddle-point stable regular MC equilibrium. For
φ˜ < σ < σ¯ there are three regular equilibria, a MC saddle-point stable and a
pair of CMC equilibria: a high-markup unstable and a low-markup saddle-point
stable. For φ < φ˜ there is a unique saddle-point stable CMC equilibrium. For
φ = φ¯ there are two steady states: a saddle-point stable regular MC and a regular
CMC that is locally a smooth-fold bifurcation. For φ = φ˜ there are two equilibria:
a saddle-point stable CMC equilibrium and a boundary equilibrium displaying a
non-smooth fold bifurcation.
2. If σ ≥ σ¯ there is a unique equilibrium whose type depends on φ. For φ > φ˜ it
is a saddle-point stable MC equilibrium. For φ < φ˜ it is a saddle-point stable
CMC equilibrium. For φ = φ˜ it is a boundary-equilibrium bifurcation displaying
saddle-point stable persistence.
We will derive Proposition 1 step by step in the next sub-section 4.1. However, first we
will interpret its meaning and implications.
Figure 3 around here
Figure 3 presents a bifurcation diagram in (K, φ) space. The left-hand-side (LHS) panel
represents the 1 < σ < σ¯ case and the right-hand-side (RHS) panel the σ ≥ σ¯ case. For
different values of the fixed cost it shows the number of equilibria and the local stability prop-
erties of each steady-state equilibrium, including the location of the discontinuity-induced
bifurcations (persistence P on the RHS panel and the non-smooth fold NF on the LHS
panel) and the smooth fold bifurcation (F on the LHS panel).
If we start with high values of φ, on the RHS panel, the initial equilibrium is saddle-point
stable (C∗M , K
∗
M), it is a MC equilibrium, and further reductions of the fixed cost keep the
local stability properties, but force it to pass through the switching boundary (C∗Σ, K
∗
Σ) and
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further evolve into a CMC equilibrium (C∗L, K
∗
L). We associate the later to a low markup as
the return function is locally decreasing.
If we do the same reasoning for the left-hand-panel panel, we should observe that there
is structural instability, i.e. there is a change on the number of equilibria and on their
local-dynamics properties for variations of φ close to its bifurcation levels: φ˜ associated to
a discontinuity-induced bifurcation of the non-smooth fold type 16, and φ¯ associated to a
smooth fold bifurcation. If we start with high values of φ the initial equilibrium (C∗M , K
∗
M)
is also saddle-point stable and it is a MC equilibrium. If we reduce φ from φ¯, then three
equilibria emerge: (C∗M , K
∗
M), an unstable high-markup CMC equilibrium (C
∗
H , K
∗
H), and a
saddle-point stable low-markup equilibrium (C∗L, K
∗
L). Further reductions of φ from φ˜, would
result in the collision of the first two equilibria at the discontinuous boundary equilibrium
bifurcation point (C∗Σ, K
∗
Σ), followed by their disappearance. For lower values of φ the steady-
state equilibrium is unique and again it is a saddle-point stable low-markup CMC (C∗L, K
∗
L).
Observe that the MC steady-state level for the capital stock does not depend on φ.
However, when the fixed cost varies, the distance to the switching boundary changes: if the
fixed cost increases, the ”competitive distance” increases. If the economy is in the CMC
regime, not only the distance of the steady state to the switching boundary varies (because
K˜ depends on φ), but the steady-state stock of capital also varies. If the elasticity σ is
low and there are multiple CMC equilibria the relative ”competitive distance” of the two
equilibria changes in a symmetric way. When the fixed cost is reduced, the unstable high-
markup equilibrium moves towards the switching barrier and the low-markup saddle-point
stable equilibrium moves away from it.
We can also observe the same by defining a partition over the domain of (φ, σ), i.e.
R++ × (1,+∞) - see Figure 4:
A = { (σ, φ) : σ > 1, φ > max{φ, φ˜ }}, DF = { (σ, φ) : 1 < σ < σ¯, φ = φ},
B = { (σ, φ) : 1 < σ < σ¯, φ˜ < φ < φ}, DNF = { (σ, φ) : 1 < σ < σ¯, φ = φ˜},
C = { (σ, φ) : σ > 1, 0 < φ < φ˜}, DP = { (σ, φ) : σ > 1, φ = φ˜}.
Figure 4 around here
This pair of crucial parameters allow us to identify the region where steady-state equilibria
lie. If (σ, φ) ∈ A, given by A1∪A2 in Figure 4, there is a single saddle-point stable stationary
MC equilibrium (K∗M , C
∗
M) ∈ S1. If (σ, φ) ∈ C, given by C1 ∪ C2 in the same picture, there is
a unique saddle-point stable stationary CMC equilibrium (K∗L, C
∗
L) ∈ S2. If (σ, φ) ∈ B, three
stationary equilibria exist: the saddle-point stable stationary MC equilibrium (K∗M , C
∗
M) ∈
S1 and the two CMC equilibria in the S2 region, the saddle-point stable (K
∗
M , C
∗
M) and
the unstable (K∗L, C
∗
L). When we observe the limits between two of the previous regions
bifurcations occur. If (σ, φ) ∈ DF∪DNF two stationary equilibria exist with a fold bifurcation
associated to one of them: on the DF frontier the bifurcation is a regular smooth one
16See subsection 4.1 below.
15
and on the DNF border it is a non-smooth one. Finally, if (σ, φ) ∈ DP persistence is the
discontinuity-induced bifurcation that emerges.
We can find a single saddle-point stable MC equilibrium like (K∗M , C
∗
M) in dynamic GE
models with a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) MC market structure - see Rotemberg and Woodford
(1995). Gal´ı and Zilibotti (1995) present a CMC model that produces a pair of equilibria
that correspond to (K∗L, C
∗
L) and (K
∗
H , C
∗
H), with the possibility of complex eigenvalues for
the latter. Gal´ı (1995) produced a different type of market structure producing endogenous
markups and also leading to multiple equilibria and non-saddle dynamics. However, the
existence of endogenous markups is not a sufficient condition to generate multiple equilibria
as we can see in Goodfriend and King (1997), Jaimovich (2007) or even in the CMC model
of Portier (1995).
4.1 Derivation of Proposition 1
Our first step is to establish the existence and number of steady states:
Lemma 3 Let σ¯, φ˜, and φ¯ be given by equations (22), (29), and (30), respectively. Then:
(1) if φ > max{φ˜, φ¯}, for any σ > 1, there is a unique regular MC steady state; (2) if
0 < φ < min{φ˜, φ¯}, for any σ > 1, there is a unique regular CMC steady state; (3) if
σ ≥ σ¯ and φ = φ˜ then there is a unique boundary steady state; (4) if 1 < σ < σ¯ and
φ˜ < φ < φ¯, there are three regular steady states, a MC and two CMC steady states;
(5) if 1 < σ < σ¯ and φ = φ¯, there are two regular steady states, one MC and the other
CMC; (6) if 1 < σ < σ˜ and φ = φ˜, there are two steady states, a regular CMC and a
boundary one.
If the elasticity of substitution between varieties is large, σ ≥ σ¯, then the steady state is
unique, but it may be associated to any regime or belong to the switching boundary. The
type of steady-state regime depends on the cost of entry φ relative to the other parameters.
First, if the fixed cost is high (or A is low) such that φ > φ˜ then there is a unique regular
MC steady state that we can determine explicitly
K∗1 = K
∗
M ≡
(
αA
ρ+ δ
(
1−
1
σ
))1/(1−α)
< K˜.
Second, if the fixed cost is low (or A is high), such that φ < φ˜, then there is a regular CMC
steady state which is unique from lemma 3, with capital stock defined by
K∗2 = { K
∗
C} = { K ∈ S2 : (1−m(K))F
′
(K) = ρ+ δ}.
In the transition between those two cases, i.e. if φ = φ˜, then the steady-state capital stock
is given by
K∗Σ = K˜(φ˜) =
(
σφ˜
αA
)1/α
=
(
α2A
ρ+ δ
(
1−
1
σ
))1/(1−α)
.
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If the elasticity is low, verifying 1 < σ < σ¯ several cases may occur. In this case we
have φ˜ < φ¯ and both similar and different possibilities are produced, as in the case of
high σ. If φ > φ¯ or φ < φ˜ we have two cases that are analogous to the previous high-
elasticity ones: we observe unique steady states associated with either K∗M or K
∗
C . However,
if φ¯ > φ > φ˜ multiple steady states exist: a regular MC, K∗M , and two regular CMC steady
states, K∗2 = {K
∗
H , K
∗
L} such that
K˜∗Σ < K
∗
H < K¯
∗ < K∗L,
where
K¯∗ = K¯(φ¯) =
(
αA
ρ+ δ
(
1−
1
σ¯
) )1/(1−α)
.
As m(K∗H) > m(K
∗
L), we call them high- and low-markup CMC steady states, respec-
tively. At last, in the boundary cases, associated to either φ = φ¯ or φ = φ˜, there are two
steady states. In the first case there is regular MC, K∗1 = K
∗
M , and a CMC steady state,
K∗2 = K¯
∗, and, in the second case, there is a boundary, K∗Σ, and a regular low-markup CMC
steady state, K∗2 = K
∗
L. As we will see below, both cases are associated to local bifurcations,
a smooth or classic one, in the first case, and a non-smooth, in the second. The steady state
K¯∗ occurs at the local maximum of the R2(K) function if the return function is globally
non-decreasing.
In order to study the local stability and bifurcation properties, we build the generalized
Jacobian in the sense of Clarke (see Clarke (1990) and Leine (2006))
J(K∗) =


J1(K
∗
1 ), if (K
∗
1 , C
∗
1) ∈ S1,
J(K∗Σ), if (K
∗
Σ, C
∗
Σ) ∈ Σ,
J2(K
∗
2 ), if (K
∗
2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2.
If we have a regular steady state belonging to the interior of subset Sj , j = 1, 2 the classic
Jacobian is
Jj(K
∗
j ) =
(
0 Cj(K
∗
j )R
′
j(K
∗
j )
−1 C
′
j(K
∗
j )
)
, K∗j ∈ Sj, j = 1, 2. (31)
where Cj(K
∗
j ) ≡ Yj(K
∗
j ) − δK
∗
j for
(
K∗j , C
∗
j
)
∈ Sj , j = 1, 2. If we have a boundary steady
state, K∗Σ = K˜, the classic Jacobian does not exist, but we can determine the generalized
differential of Clarke evaluated at that point as the convex hull of the derivatives at that
point, which in our case becomes
J(K∗Σ) = {(1− q)J1(K) + qJ2(K) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, K = K
∗
Σ},
as the boundary steady state is completely characterized by the capital stock level K∗Σ.
The eigenvalues of the Jacobians associated to regular steady states are
λ−j =
C
′
j(K
∗
j )
2
−∆(Jj(K
∗
j ))
1/2, λ+j =
C
′
j(K
∗
j )
2
+∆(Jj(K
∗
j ))
1/2, for j = 1, 2,
where the discriminant is
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∆(Jj) =
(
C
′
j(K
∗
j )
2
)2
− Cj(K
∗
j )R
′
j(K
∗
j ), j = 1, 2.
The eigenvalues are continuous functions of the parameters, in particular of φ and σ.
If, as a result of a continuous change in a parameter, at least one eigenvalue associated
to a regular steady state crosses the imaginary axis we say the equilibrium point (K∗, C∗)
undergoes a smooth bifurcation17.
Lemma 4 1. Assume there is a regular MC steady state (K∗1 , C
∗
1 ) ∈ S1. Then it is
saddle-point stable.
2. Assume there is a regular CMC steady state (K∗2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2. Then, if R
′
2(K
∗
2) < 0
it is saddle-point stable, if R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) > 0 it is a non-oscilatory unstable node, and
if R
′
2(K
∗
2) = 0 it is a smooth fold bifurcation point.
Local dynamics and bifurcations in the neighborhood of boundary steady states for PWS
continuous systems have been studied in the applied mathematics literature, though there
are different approaches and nomenclatures18. di Bernardo et al. (2008) use the expres-
sion discontinuity-induced bifurcations for a generic change in structural stability in a PWS
dynamic system, upon a change in a parameter. There is a boundary-equilibrium bifur-
cation at a boundary steady state, K∗Σ, if for φ = φ˜ the Jacobians at the boundaries of
the two contiguous branches, S1 and S2, verify det (Jj(K
∗
Σ, φ˜)) 6= 0, for j = 1, 2. Two
types of boundary-equilibrium bifurcations may exist: persistence, if at the bifurcation point
(K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ) a regular equilibrium in branch Sj is turned into a regular equilibrium in branch
S−j after a small variation in the bifurcating parameter, φ; or non-smooth fold, if there is a
collision on the boundary of two regular steady states with different stability properties from
both branches, and we observe their disappearance after a small change in the bifurcating
parameter.
Lemma 5 Let (K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ) be a boundary steady state. Then a boundary-equilibrium bifur-
cation occurs at φ = φ˜ if σ 6= σ¯19. If 1 < σ < σ¯, there is a non-smooth fold bifurcation
and if σ > σ¯, there is persistence.
We need to determine the eigenvalues of the Jacobian in order to have a specific char-
acterization of the local dynamics at the boundary steady state. As the Jacobian J(K∗Σ) is
17For the existence of classic or smooth bifurcations in PWS dynamic systems see di Bernardo et al. (2008).
Leine (2006) calls them continuous bifurcations.
18For two alternative approaches see Leine and Nijmeier (2004) or di Bernardo et al. (2008). On local-
bifurcation analysis see Freire et al. (1998), Leine (2006), and the previous references.
19This is a co-dimension-one bifurcation. If φ = φ˜ and σ = σ¯ a co-dimension two type of bifurcation may
occur, which seems to be new in the literature. It is a kind of non-smooth fold-fold bifurcation.
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set-valued, so are its generalized eigenvalues,
Λ±(K∗Σ) =
{
λ±Σ(q) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1
}
,
where λ±Σ(q) are the eigenvalues of the generalized Jacobian JΣ(q) ≡ J(K
∗
Σ, q) = (1 −
q)J1(K
∗
Σ) + qJ2(K
∗
Σ). Observe that, although λ
±
Σ(0) = λ
±
1 (K
∗
Σ) and λ
±
Σ(1) = λ
±
2 (K
∗
Σ), we
have λ±Σ(q) 6= (1− q)λ
±
1 (K
∗
Σ) + qλ
±
2 (K
∗
Σ).
Lemma 6 The generalized eigenvalues Λ±(K∗Σ) are real. If σ > σ¯ then Λ
− ⊂ R−− and
Λ+ ⊂ R++. If 1 < σ < σ¯ then Λ
− ⊂ R and Λ+ ⊂ R++. In this case there is a value for
q, q0 ≡ (σ − 1)/(σ¯ − 1) such that λ
−
Σ(q
0)) = 0.
If we consider Lemmas 5 and 6 together we can conclude the following. If the elasticity σ is
large and the bifurcation parameter φ is reduced continuously towards φ˜, in the neighborhood
of a boundary steady state, a saddle-point regular MC steady state is continued as a saddle
point at the boundary-equilibrium bifurcation, and for further reductions, into a saddle-
point regular CMC steady state. This is the meaning of persistence in our case. On the
other hand, if the elasticity σ is low and φ is slightly larger than φ˜ there will be two regular
steady states, a saddle-point stable MC and an unstable CMC, which, upon reduction of the
fixed cost will both collide at the boundary steady state and will both disappear for further
reductions. This is the particular instance of a non-smooth fold bifurcation in our model.
This type of behavior is generated by a discontinuity in the first derivatives which does not
occur in smooth dynamic systems.
4.2 Local dynamics at the switching boundary
Candidate trajectories, including equilibrium trajectories presented in section 3, may contact
the switching boundary in infinite time when there is a boundary steady-state equilibrium.
If σ > σ¯, equilibrium trajectories converge to it along the saddle paths passing through
(K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ). Piecewise smoothness of the vector field implies that the slopes of the saddle
paths are not collinear in both branches separated by Σ. If σ < σ¯ equilibrium trajectories
converge to the boundary equilibrium ifK(0) < K∗Σ and they diverge from it, moving towards
the low-markup CMC equilibrium if K(0) > K∗Σ. This is the consequence of the existence
of a non-smooth fold bifurcation.
Candidate trajectories, including equilibrium trajectories, may contact the switching
boundary in finite time if a boundary steady-state equilibrium does not exist. Advances
in the study of this behavior use the Filippov convex method, as we do below (see Filippov
(1988), and Leine and Nijmeier (2004)).
Let us write compactly the vector fields in the two sub-domains as fj(K,C) for (K,C) ∈
Sj and j = 1, 2. Accordingly we will use the vector-field notation C˙ = fj,C (K,C), i.e. the
RHS of equation (26), and K˙ = fj,K (K,C), i.e. the RHS of equation (27), again for (K,C) ∈
Sj with j = 1, 2. Consider a trajectory that reaches the switching boundary Σ at time tΣ,
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Φcj(tΣ) ∈ Σ, coming from branch Sj ( j = 1, 2). Recalling the definition of Σ in equation
(24), we know that Φcj,K(tΣ) = K˜. Let us define the function h(K,C) ≡ m(K) − 1/σ. The
behavior of the vector field fj (·), as regards the normal to Σ, can be obtained from the
following two functions vj(K,C) and aj(K,C):
vj(K,C) =
∂
∂t
h
(
Φcj(0)
)
= Lfjh(K,C), j = 1, 2, (32)
and
aj(K,C) =
∂2
∂t2
h
(
Φcj(0)
)
= L2fjh(K,C), j = 1, 2, (33)
where Lfjh and L
2
fj
h are the first and second Lie derivatives of function h(K,C) evaluated
at (K,C) ∈ Σ, along the projections of vector field fj (·) into the normal of h(K,C) = 0:
Lfjh(K,C) =
∂h
∂C
fj,C +
∂h
∂K
fj,K , (34)
and
L2fjh(K,C) =
∂
∂C
(
∂h
∂C
fj,C +
∂h
∂K
fj,K
)
fj,C +
∂
∂K
(
∂h
∂C
fj,C +
∂h
∂K
fj,K
)
fj,K. (35)
The literature on PWS continuous systems tells us that there are two main types of con-
tact of trajectories originated in branch Sj with the switching boundary, when no boundary
equilibrium points exist: traversing or grazing trajectories. This allows a partition of the
switching boundary into a traverse subset,
Σt ≡ { (K,C) ∈ Σ : v1(K,C)v2(K,C) > 0} ,
and a subset in which grazing is observed inside Sj
Σgj ≡ { (K,C) ∈ Σ : vj(K,C) = 0, aj(K,C) 6= 0} .
The full grazing subset is defined as Σg = Σg1 ∪ Σ
g
2.
Given our definitions of sets Sj in equations (23) and (25), and the fact that h(K,C) > 0
(h(K,C) < 0) for K < K˜ (K > K˜), if Lfjh(K,C) > 0 the trajectory crosses Σ in the
direction of a decreasing K and if Lfjh(K,C) < 0 it crosses the boundary in the direction
of an increasing K. Also, if a grazing point exists, the structure of h (·) implies that, for
aj(K,C) > 0, grazing takes place from side S1.
Lemma 7 Let C˜ = Y1(K˜)− δK˜ = Y2(K˜)− δK˜. Then:
1. Σt = {(K˜, C) : C 6= C˜};
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2. For any values of the parameters, if ΦcC(K˜, tΣ) > C˜ then candidate trajectories
traverse Σ by decreasing K, i.e. ∂Φcj,K(K˜, tΣ)/∂t < 0, for j = 1, 2. If Φ
c
C(K˜, tΣ) <
C˜ then candidate trajectories traverse Σ by increasing K, i.e. ∂Φcj,K(K˜, tΣ)/∂t >
0, for j = 1, 2.
3. If φ < φ˜ then Σg = Σg1 = {(K˜, C˜)} and Σ
g
2 is empty. If φ > φ˜ then Σ
g = Σg2 =
{(K˜, C˜)} and Σg1 is empty.
From Lemma 7 we conclude that grazing is unilateral. For φ < φ˜, there is a candidate
trajectory which grazes Σ within S1, i.e. Φ
c
1,C(K˜, tΣ) = C˜. For φ > φ˜, there is a candidate
trajectory which grazes Σ within S2, i.e. Φ
c
2,C(K˜, tΣ) = C˜. di Bernardo et al. (2008) call a
point like (K˜, C˜) a regular grazing point.
We call grazing trajectory to a candidate trajectory that is tangent to Σ. If grazing
happens to trajectories inside Sj, then a grazing trajectory separates Sj into a subset in which
trajectories departing from inside of it approach Σ, but do not collide with the boundary and
curl back into Sj , from a subset in which trajectories starting within traverse the boundary Σ
to branch S−j. Traversing candidate trajectories close to the grazing trajectory may exhibit
two types of behavior: either they curl back to Σ and traverse it returning to Sj , or they
continue only at branch S−j . Then there is a separating trajectory, that tends to converge to
an equilibrium point in Sj . In fact, this trajectory is the GE trajectory and belongs to the
stable manifold associated to a stationary equilibrium point. From this, we conclude that
grazing trajectories are candidate trajectories but are not GE trajectories.
5 Global General-Equilibrium Dynamics
Apparently, explicit solutions for equilibrium (and candidate) trajectories do not exist, so we
have to resort to qualitative analysis of the equilibrium dynamics by drawing on the results
from the two previous sections.
There are two main results in terms of global GE dynamics. First, there is the possibility
of transient or long-run change in regime from MC to CMC, depending on the relationship
between the fixed cost and the initial level of the capital stock to the remaining parameters
in the model. Second, there is the dependence of the structural dynamics on the curvature
properties of the return function, which is related to the elasticity of substitution amongst
varieties.
Next we present the most representative GE trajectories using phase diagrams for the
cases where there is either a unique steady-state equilibrium or multiple long-run equilibria.
Proposition 2 Let φ > max{φ¯, φ˜}, for any σ > 1, and assume that K(0) > 0 . Then there
is a unique saddle-point stable MC stationary equilibrium (K∗M , C
∗
M). The GE path
[Φ(t,K(0))]t≥0, where Φ(t) = (ΦK(t),ΦC(t))
⊤, converges asymptotically to (K∗M , C
∗
M),
independently of the regime associated to K(0) at time t = 0. In particular, if K(0) >
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K˜ then both capital and consumption adjust downwards, the convergence is PWS
continuous, the equilibrium path verifies ΦK(tΣ, K(0)) = K˜, where tΣ > 0 is the time
of collision with the boundary Σ, and ΦgC(t,K(0)) < ΦC(t,K(0)) < βΦK(t,K(0)) for
0 < t ≤ tΣ, where [Φ
g(t)] is the grazing trajectory, which grazes Σ from S2 at point
(K˜, C˜).
Figure 5 depicts the complete phase diagram associated to Proposition 2. If the initial
capital stock satisfies 0 < K(0) < K˜ then both the initial and the stationary state of
the economy exhibit a MC regime and the markup is constant, i.e. it is independent of
the transitional dynamics. The dynamics is smooth in this region (S1) and it depends on
the relative position of K(0) regarding K∗M . If K(0) is greater (smaller) than K
∗
M , then
there is a downward (upward) adjustment in both variables. If the initial capital stock is
above the switching boundary, i.e. if K(0) > K˜, then the economy starts from a CMC
regime and it shifts to the MC regime along the transition path at time t = tΣ. In the
beginning of the adjustment the markup is endogenous and counter-cyclical: both output
and consumption decrease while the markup adjusts upwards. At time tΣ there is exactly
one firm per industry, as the economy switches from a CMC to a MC regime. At this point,
the markup becomes exogenous and constant while the mass of the continuum of varieties
shrinks continuously along the convergence to the stationary equilibrium (K∗M , C
∗
M). The GE
equilibrium path lies along the stable manifold associated with MC equilibrium, represented
by W sM = W
s(K∗M , C
∗
M), which belongs to both branches S1 and S2, and is therefore non-
smooth. Notice that for K(0) > K∗M the stable manifold lies between the schedule C = βK
and the PWS isocline K˙ = 0.
Figure 5 around here
Proposition 3 Let φ < min{φ¯, φ˜}, for any σ > 1, and assume that K(0) > 0 . Then there
is a unique saddle-point stable CMC stationary equilibrium (K∗L, C
∗
L). The GE path
[Φ(t,K(0))]t≥0, where Φ(t) converges asymptotically to (K
∗
L, C
∗
L), independently of the
regime associated to K(0) at time t = 0. In particular, if K(0) < K˜ then both capital
and consumption adjust upwards, the convergence is PWS continuous, the equilibrium
path verifies ΦK(tΣ, K(0)) = K˜, where tΣ > 0 is the time of collision with the boundary
Σ, and ΦgC(t,K(0)) > ΦC(t,K(0)) > βΦK(t,K(0)) for 0 < t ≤ tΣ, where [Φ
g(t)] is the
grazing trajectory, which grazes Σ from S1 at point (K˜, C˜).
Figure 6 depicts the complete phase diagram associated to Proposition 3. The interpre-
tation is similar to that of Figure 5. The GE equilibrium path lies along the stable manifold
associated with the low-markup CMC equilibrium, W sL =W
s(K∗L, C
∗
L), which also belongs to
both branches S1 and S2, and is non-smooth. In this case, if the initial state of the economy
is in the MC regime and the initial capital stock lies in the interval
(
0, K˜
)
, then it increases
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in the transition and there is a switch in the regime along the way. In the beginning, the
markup is uncorrelated with economic activity, but then intra-industrial entry occurs as soon
as the capital stock reaches K˜. From that point onwards competition will drive the markup
counter-cyclically down.
Figure 6 around here
Multiple steady-state equilibria exist in the remaining cases. Here we deal with the
generic case in which 1 < σ < σ¯ and φ˜ < φ < φ¯. From Proposition 1, we already know
that there are three steady-state equilibria, (K∗M , C
∗
M), (K
∗
H , C
∗
H), and (K
∗
L, C
∗
L), which are
collinear, i.e. C∗j = βK
∗
j , j = M,H,L, with K
∗
M < K
∗
H < K
∗
L.
As we will show next, two heteroclinic orbits exist. First, there is a smooth hetero-
clinic orbit joining the two CMC stationary equilibria (K∗H , C
∗
H) and (K
∗
L, C
∗
L) denoted by
ΓHL. This heteroclinic orbit lives in subset S2 and coincides with the intersection between
the unstable manifold associated to (K∗H , C
∗
H), W
u
H , and the stable manifold associated to
(K∗L, C
∗
L), W
s
L, i.e. ΓHL = W
u
H ∩W
s
L. There is also a second, PWS heteroclinic orbit, ΓHM ,
joining the CMC equilibrium (K∗H , C
∗
H) ∈ S2 to the MC equilibrium (K
∗
M , C
∗
M) ∈ S1. Again,
the heteroclinic orbit is defined as the intersection between the unstable manifold associ-
ated to (K∗H , C
∗
H), W
u
H , and the stable manifold associated to (K
∗
M , C
∗
M), W
s
M . Therefore,
ΓHM = W
u
H ∩W
s
M is continuous, but PWS since it has a discontinuity in its derivatives at
Σ.
Proposition 4 Assume that 1 < σ < σ¯ and φ˜ < φ < φ¯, and also that K(0) > 0. Then
there are three stationary equilibria: a MC saddle-point stable equilibrium, (K∗M , C
∗
M),
a high-markup CMC unstable equilibrium, (K∗H , C
∗
H), and a low-markup saddle-point
stable CMC equilibrium, (K∗L, C
∗
L), such that K
∗
L > K
∗
H > K
∗
M and C
∗
j = βK
∗
j , with
j = L,H,M . If K(0) > K∗L then the equilibrium path [Φ(t,K(0)]t≥0 adjusts down-
wards towards the low-markup equilibrium (K∗L, C
∗
L). If K(0) < K
∗
M then the equilib-
rium path converges upwards to the MC equilibrium (K∗M , C
∗
M). If K
∗
H < K(0) < K
∗
L
then the equilibrium path converges upwards to (K∗L, C
∗
L) along the smooth hetero-
clinic trajectory ΓHL. If K
∗
M < K(0) < K
∗
H then the economy converges downwards
to (K∗M , C
∗
M) along the PWS heteroclinic trajectory ΓHM .
Figure 7 around here
Figure 7 illustrates Proposition 4. The equilibrium trajectory belongs to the stable
manifolds associated to (K∗M , C
∗
M) and (K
∗
L, C
∗
L), W
s
M and W
s
L. Both these manifolds are
obtained as the union of two branches and exhibit a common point at the unstable steady-
state equilibrium (K∗H , C
∗
H). The branches that start in this long-run equilibrium feature
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heteroclinic trajectories ΓHM and ΓHL. The necessity of the existence of heteroclinic orbits,
which have a global nature, is obvious: the basins of attraction of the two saddle-point stable
equilibria should be bounded.
Equilibrium paths are ”trapped” by the two manifolds defined by curves C = βK and
C = C(K), i.e. the isocline K˙ = 0. Geometrically, if the latter is above (below) the former
then both capital and consumption increase (decrease).
Depending on the initial level of the capital stock, rational agents ”choose” a MC equilib-
rium (K∗M , C
∗
M) or a CMC equilibrium with a low markup (K
∗
L, C
∗
L). The dividing barrier is
given by the CMC equilibrium with a high markup (K∗H , C
∗
H). Off course, the economy may
be trapped in the high-markup CMC equilibrium, which is totally unstable. A small shift
in any parameter forces the economy to converge to one of the two saddle-point stable equi-
libria. In some sense there is a kind of juxtaposition of the two previous cases with unique
stationary equilibria if the economy is located in one of the sides of the barrier. Nonetheless,
there is an important difference: there are restrictions on the possibility of regime shifts
along transition paths. If the economy starts from a MC equilibrium it never converges to a
CMC stationary equilibrium. However, the converse is not true: if the initial stock of capital
associated with a CMC dynamics is such that K˜ < K(0) < K∗H then the economy converges
to a MC equilibrium. This asymmetry is related to the fact that in this case there is a small
elasticity of substitution in the demand for intermediate goods, which can be interpreted as
a case where there is an overall low level of flexibility in the economy.
In all the cases in Propositions 2, 3, and 4 the equilibrium is determinate, and it is
Markovian (in the sense of Santos (2002)), even for the cases where the function is non-
monotonic, similarly to Skiba (1978) and Dechert and Nishimura (1983). However, to our
knowledge, this type of global dynamics arising from the change in regime associated to PWS
dynamics, has not been analyzed in the macroeconomics literature. The regime switch along
the path, linked to the non-smooth dynamics, offers a novel vision on the interaction between
the industrial structure of economies and their macroeconomic equilibrium. Reasonably
competitive economies may end up in a bad equilibrium if the fixed costs faced by its firms
are high. Conversely, economies showing a poor competitive performance may end up in a
good (second-best) equilibrium if increasing returns are not substantial.
6 Technology and Regime Switching
One interesting possibility in this model is the effect of a permanent technological shock, i.e.
a permanent increase in A, on the long-run regime of the model. A bifurcation diagram is
presented in Figure 8.
Figure 8 around here
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Let us start with the simplest case and assume (σ, φ) ∈ A2. The initial long-run equi-
librium is depicted by point E0 in Figure 9. Now, assume there is a permanent technology
shock that sets a new value A = A1 > A0. Considering equation (17), then we know that
the value for K˜ decreases to K˜ (A1).
Assume also that K∗0 > K˜ (A1), i.e. the shock is large enough to make the economy
switch from a MC to a CMC regime. Since we know that, for the CMC region, we have
R (K) = (1−m (K))F ′ (K), an increase in A will lead to a upward shift in the R (·) schedule.
This is always the case as ∂m
∂A
< 0 and ∂F
′
∂A
> 0 and that leads to a new long-run equilibrium
like point E1 in Figure 8
20.
Figure 9 around here
Thus, we can conclude that a small permanent technology shock hitting an economy
in a unique stable MC equilibrium close to the switching boundary may have substantial
long-run effects since the economy shifts to a CMC regime with a lower equilibrium markup.
Of course a negative shock can have the opposite effect. Notice this means the economy is
no longer in region A2, as it moved to C2.
The situation is even more interesting when (σ, φ) ∈ B and we have three equilibria.
With a similar shock we may have the case depicted in Figure 10.
Figure 10 around here
This economy crossed the bifurcation to theA1 region and there is now a new low-markup
CMC equilibrium for the long run given by point E1.
Interestingly, even if the shock is temporary, the economy will not go back to E0 as long
as it accumulates enough capital in order to have K (τ) > K∗H when the shock vanishes at
t = τ > 0.
7 Conclusion
When we analyze dynamic systems, we may encounter structural changes associated to
non-smoothness, such as discontinuities in derivatives. We find exactly such non-smooth
dynamics in a simple dynamic GE model with Cournotian Monopolistic Competition and
instantaneous free entry. The model endogenously generates two regimes with different
economic and dynamic features: i) a stable monopoly regime associated with very high
markup levels and low welfare and ii) an oligopoly regime that may produce one or two
20The increase in the value of K∗ is unambiguous since R (·) is always non-increasing in K.
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equilibria, a stable low-markup and an unstable high-markup one, where the latter works
as a threshold between regimes. The two regimes have different dynamics and there is a
switching boundary between them. We provide a rigorous study of the non-smooth dynamics
and we also analyze the global dynamics of the model, demonstrating that it may exhibit
robust heteroclinic orbits, either of the smooth or the non-smooth type. We show that two
economies exhibiting the same fundamental parameters may behave very differently, as they
may be in two different regimes. Additionally, it is possible for one economy to change
regime along its convergence to a stable long-run equilibrium. Fixed costs and elasticities
of demand play a crucial role in this model: changing their values may alter the dynamics
in a radical way, either by inducing a discontinuous transition or a discontinuous hysteresis.
In economic terms, we have the possibility of one, two or three steady-state equilibria,
connected by heteroclinic orbits. When there is a unique equilibrium, we have two possible
types (both saddle-point stable): one monopolistic with a high and constant markup, and the
other oligopolistic with a low and endogenous countercyclical markup. When there are three
equilibria, there can be a ”threshold” effect, with low initial levels of capital stock leading
to the low-output monopolistic equilibrium and with high levels leading to the high-output
oligopolistic equilibrium.
In this paper we have assumed that there is an exogenous labor supply: we leave it to
further work to see how the dynamics become even richer with an endogenous labor supply.
We would also like to relax the assumption of instantaneous free entry, allowing for the flow
of entry to be determined by an endogenous cost of entry as in Brito and Dixon (2009): there
will be two state variables (the number of firms and the capital stock) driving the markup.
This would not affect the steady-state equilibria (since in steady state the cost of entry is
zero), but would influence the dynamics out of steady state.
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A Proofs.
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas 1-7.
Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Considering F (K) is continuous and smooth, and taking into account equations
(18) and (19), then Y (K) and R(K) are continuous, but are only smooth in the interior the
subsets (0, K˜) or (K˜,∞). Both functions are also continuous at the boundary value K˜, as
Y1(K˜) = Y2(K˜) and R1(K˜) = R2(K˜). However, they are not differentiable in the classical
sense since Y
′
1 (K˜) 6= Y
′
2 (K˜) and R
′
1(K˜) 6= R
′
2(K˜) as we demonstrate below. Following Leine
and Nijmeier (2004) we use the generalized derivative of Clarke (1990), evaluated at K = K˜,
denoted here as ∂Y (K˜) and ∂R(K˜). Therefore the generalized gradients ∂Y (K) and ∂R(K),
as in equations (20) and (21) are set-valued functions. We obtain Y
′
1 (K) = (1 −
1
σ
)F
′
(K)
and Y
′
2 (K) = (1−m(K)/2)F
′(K) for non-boundary K and, for K = K˜ we have
0 < Y
′
1 (K˜) =
(
1−
1
σ
)
F
′
(K˜) < Y
′
2 (K˜) =
(
1−
1
2σ
)
F
′
(K˜)
implying that the generalized derivative at K˜ is ∂Y (K˜) =
[
Y
′
1 (K˜), Y
′
2 (K˜)
]
⊂ R++.
We derive R
′
1(K) = (1 −
1
σ
)F
′′
(K) and R
′
2(K) = (1−m(K))F
′′
(K) − m
′
(K)F
′
(K) where
m
′
(K) = −m(K)F
′
(K)/(2F (K)) < 0. Then, R
′
2(K) = (1−m(K))F
′′
(K) +m(K) (F
′
(K))2
2F (K)
,
in general and for the Cobb-Douglas production function we have
R
′
2(K) = −
(2 − α)
2
(
2(1− α)
2− α
−m(K)
)
αAKα−2. (36)
For boundary K = K˜ we obtain
R
′
1(K˜) =
(
1−
1
σ
)
F
′′
(K˜) < R
′
2(K˜) =
(
1−
1
σ
)
F
′′
(K˜) +
(F
′
(K˜))2
2σF (K˜)
,
in general, and for Cobb-Douglas function we have
R
′
1(K˜) =
(
1−
1
σ
)
α(α− 1)AK˜α−2 < 0, R
′
2(K˜) = −
(2− α)
2
(
2(1− α)
2− α
−
1
σ
)
αAK˜α−2,
which has an ambiguous sign. Then the generalized gradient is ∂R(K˜) =
[
R
′
1(K˜), R
′
2(K˜)
]
⊂
R has a positive measure for any K˜.
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Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. The generalized second derivative for the production function (18) is
∂2Y (K) =


Y
′′
1 (K) if 0 ≤ K < K˜,
∂2Y (K˜) if K = K˜,
Y
′′
2 (K) if K > K˜,
(37)
where ∂2Y (K˜) is the convex hull of Y
′′
1 (K) and Y
′′
2 (K) at K = K˜, ∂
2Y (K˜) = { (1 −
q)Y
′′
1 (K˜) + qY
′′
2 (K˜) : 0 ≤ q ≤ 1}. For the Cobb-Douglas function we have Y
′′
1 (K) =
−(1− α)(1− 1/σ)F
′
(K)/K < 0 and
Y
′
2 (K) = −
(2− α)
2
(
2(1− α)
2− α
−
m(K)
2
)
F
′
(K)
K
.
where F
′
(K)/K = αAKα−2. Now, recall the (generalized) differential of R(K) in equation
(21) and its properties from Lemma 1. Let us consider separately the two sub-domains
divided by K˜. For the first sub-domain, where K ∈ (0, K˜), we have R
′
1(K) = Y
′′
1 (K) < 0
for all possible values for the parameters. In the second sub-domain, where K > K˜, we
already know that m(K) < 1/σ. If we define m¯ = 1/σ¯, we conclude from equation (36)
that R
′
2(K) has the same sign as m(K) − m¯ and from equation (37) that Y
′′
2 (K) has the
same sign as m(K) − 2m¯. Therefore, several cases can occur: First, if σ > σ¯ then m(K) <
1/σ < 1/σ¯ < 2/σ¯ which implies R
′
2(K) < 0 and Y
′′
2 (K) < 0 for all K > K˜. Second, if σ < σ¯
then m¯ = 1/σ¯ < 1/σ and the relationship between m(K) and m¯ is ambiguous. However,
the critical level for the capital stock K¯ is such that m(K¯) = 1/σ. Therefore R
′
2(K) T 0
if and only if m(K) S m¯, but m(K) S m¯ if and only if K˜ < K S K¯. In the same sub-
domain, we also have Y
′′
2 (K) T 0 if and only if m(K) S 2m¯. But m(K) S 2m¯ if and only
if K˜ < K S
(
2σ¯
σ
)2/α
K˜. However, the latter holds only if 1 < σ < σ¯/2 = (2 − α)/4(1− α),
which is only possible for α > 3/4.
Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. Equation (28) implies that steady states of system (26)-(27) are fully characterized
by steady states of the capital stock, formally determined asK∗ = {K ∈ R+ : R(K) = ρ+δ}.
From the definition and the properties of the return function, in equation (19) and Lemma
2, and from its depiction in Figures 1 and 2, we can readily see that the following cases may
occur:
1. If σ ≥ σ¯ the return function R(K) is monotonically decreasing and PWS concave (see
Lemma 1), and we have three possible cases:
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(a) if ρ + δ < R1(K˜) = R2(K˜), there is a unique regular equilibrium (K
∗
1 , C
∗
1) ∈ S1
given by the equilibrium condition R1(K) = ρ + δ. This case occurs if and only
if φ > φ˜ where φ˜ is defined in equation (29);
(b) if ρ + δ = R1(K˜) = R2(K˜) = R(K˜), there is a unique boundary equilibrium
(K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ) ∈ Σ. This holds if and only if φ = φ˜;
(c) if ρ + δ > R1(K˜) = R2(K˜), there is a unique regular equilibrium (K
∗
2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2
given by the equilibrium condition R2(K) = ρ + δ. This case occurs if and only
if φ < φ˜.
2. If 1 < σ < σ¯ we proved in Lemma 1 that the return function is neither monotonically
decreasing nor globally concave. Additionally, we proved that it is decreasing for
K ∈ (0, K˜)∪ (K¯,∞), it is increasing for K ∈ (K˜, K¯), and it reaches a local maximum
at K = K¯. At point K˜, in addition to the generalized derivative, there is the convex
hull of slopes ranging to negative (at the left) to positive (at the right). Those properties
imply that R2(K¯) > R1(K˜) = R2(K˜). Then, five cases are possible:
(a) for ρ + δ > R2(K¯), there is one regular steady state (K
∗
1 , C
∗
1) ∈ S1 given by the
equilibrium condition R1(K) = ρ+ δ. This case occurs if and only if φ > φ¯;
(b) for ρ+ δ = R2(K¯), there are two regular steady states: (K
∗
1 , C
∗
1) ∈ S1, such that
R1(K
∗
1 ) = ρ + δ, and
(
K¯∗, C
∗
)
∈ S2, such that R2(K) = ρ + δ and R
′
2(K) = 0.
This case occurs if and only if φ = φ¯;
(c) for R(K˜) < ρ+ δ < R2(K¯), there are three regular steady states: (K
∗
1 , C
∗
1) ∈ S1,
such that R1(K
∗
1 ) = ρ+ δ and a pair of (K
∗
2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2 such that K
∗
2 = { K
∗
H , K
∗
L}
with K˜ < K∗M < K¯ < K
∗
L, considering the condition R2(K) = ρ+ δ holds for two
values of K ∈
(
K¯,+∞
)
. This case occurs if and only if φ¯ < φ < φ˜;
(d) for ρ + δ = R(K˜), once again two steady states exist: a boundary steady state
(K∗Σ, C
∗
Σ) ∈ Σ and a regular steady state (K
∗
2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2, such that K
∗
2 > K¯. This
case holds if and only if φ = φ˜;
(e) for ρ + δ < R(K˜), there is again an isolated regular steady state (K∗2 , C
∗
2) ∈ S2
and the equilibrium condition is given by R2(K) = ρ+ δ. This case occurs if and
only if φ < φ˜.
Proof of Lemma 4
Proof. The classic Jacobian in equation (31), associated to a regular steady state, has trace
and determinant given by
tr(Jj(K
∗
j )) = C
′
j(K
∗
j ),
(
K∗j , C
∗
j
)
∈ Sj , j = 1, 2,
det(Jj(K
∗
j )) = Cj(K
∗
j )R
′
j(K
∗
j ),
(
K∗j , C
∗
j
)
∈ Sj , j = 1, 2.
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If the steady-state equilibrium point (K∗1 , C
∗
1) belongs to branch S1, then we obtain tr(J1(K
∗
1 )) =
C
′
1(K
∗
1 ) = Y
′
1 (K
∗
1)− δ = ρ > 0 and det(J1(K
∗
1)) = C1(K
∗
1 )R
′
1(K
∗
1 ) = −(1 − α)(ρ+ δ)β < 0.
Therefore, the eigenvalues of J1(K
∗
1 ) are both real and given by λ
−
1 < 0 < λ
+
1 . If the
steady-state equilibrium point (K∗2 , C
∗
2) belongs to branch S2 then
C2(K
∗
2 ) = Y2(K
∗
2 )− δK
∗
2 = (1−m(K
∗
2 ))F (K
∗
2)− δK
∗
2 =
=
(
(1−m(K∗2 ))
F
′
(K∗2 )
α
− δ
)
K∗2 = βK
∗
2 ,
and
R
′
2(K
∗
2)K
∗
2 = −
[
1− α− (2− α)
m(K∗2 )
2
]
F
′
(K∗2 ) =
= −(1−m(K∗2 ))F
′
(K∗2) + α
(
1−
m(K∗2 )
2
)
F
′
(K∗2 ) =
= −R2(K
∗
2) + αδ + αC
′
2(K
∗
2 ) =
= α
(
C
′
2(K
∗
2)−
C2(K
∗
2)
K∗2
)
=
= α
(
C
′
2(K
∗
2)− β
)
.
Thus
tr(J2(K
∗
2 )) = C
′
2(K
∗
2) = β +R
′
2(K
∗
2 )K
∗
2/α,
and
det(J2(K
∗
2 )) = C2(K
∗
2 )R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) = βR
′
2(K
∗
2 )K
∗
2 .
If R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) < 0 then det(J2(K
∗
2 )) < 0 and the equilibrium point is saddle-point stable, i.e.
λ−2 < 0 < λ
+
2 . If R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) = 0 then det(J2(K
∗
2)) = 0 and λ
−
2 = 0 < λ
+
2 = β. If R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) > 0
then tr(J2(K
∗
2 )) > β > 0 and det(J2(K
∗
2)) > 0, and since
0 <
(
β − R
′
2(K
∗
2 )K
∗
2/α
2
)2
< ∆(J2) <
(
β +R
′
2(K
∗
2 )K
∗
2/α
2
)2
,
then the eigenvalues are real and verify λ+2 > λ
−
2 > 0. Considering that 1 < σ < σ is a
necessary condition to obtain R
′
2(K
∗
2 ) = 0 and it is verified if φ crosses continuously the
value of φ, then the point K∗2 is a continuous bifurcation point - see Leine (2006).
Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. If K∗ = K˜(φ˜) = K∗Σ, from the expressions in the proof of Lemma 4 we obtain the
determinants of the Jacobians evaluated at the closures of branches S1 and S2, det(J1(K
∗
Σ)) =
−(1−α)(ρ+ δ)β < 0, and det(J2(K
∗
Σ)) = −β(1−α)(ρ+ δ)(σ− σ¯)/(σ−1), which is different
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from zero for σ 6= σ¯. If this condition holds then an equilibrium such that K∗ = K˜, occurring
for φ = φ˜ in which case K˜(φ˜) = K∗Σ, is a boundary-equilibrium bifurcation. To characterize
the type of bifurcation we use the method in di Bernardo et al. (2008). Let us consider
the system (26)-(27) and study a perturbation of the parameter φ about the value φ˜ of
the equilibrium away from K∗Σ by linearizing it locally. If we write the system (26)-(27)
compactly as
x˙ =
{
f1(x, φ) if h(x, φ) > 0,
f2(x, φ) if h(x, φ) < 0,
where x = (C,K)⊤. Let x∗ be the boundary equilibrium for φ = φ˜. For any pair (x, φ) we
have f2(x, φ)−f1(x, φ) = g(x, φ)h(x, φ). Those authors prove that, under the non-degeneracy
conditions det ( ∂
∂x
f
1
(x∗, φ˜)) 6= 0, D1 ≡
∂
∂φ
h(x∗, φ˜)− ∂
∂φ
h(x∗, φ˜)⊤ ∂
∂x
f1(x
∗, φ˜)−1 ∂
∂µ
f1(x
∗, φ˜) 6= 0
and D2 ≡ 1+
∂
∂φ
h(x∗, φ˜)⊤ ∂
∂x
f1(x
∗, φ˜)−1g(x∗, φ˜), there is persistence at the boundary equilib-
rium bifurcation if D2 > 0 and there is a non-smooth fold bifurcation if D2 < 0. In our case,
the non-degeneracy conditions hold at a boundary equilibrium bifurcation as det(J2(K
∗
Σ) 6= 0,
due to D1 = (2σφ˜)
−1 > 0 and D2 = (σ − σ¯)/(σ − 1). Then D2 > 0 (D2 < 0) if σ > σ¯
(1 < σ < σ¯) and D2 6= 0 for a boundary-equilibrium bifurcation (of co-dimension one).
Proof of Lemma 6
Proof. At the boundary equilibrium K∗Σ we have 0 < tr(J1(K
∗
Σ) = ρ < tr(J2(K
∗
Σ)) =
ρ + (ρ + δ)/(2(σ − 1)) and det(J2(K
∗
Σ)) = det(J1(K
∗
Σ))(σ − σ¯)(σ − 1) and det(J1(K
∗
Σ)) =
−(1− α)(ρ+ δ)β < 0. Therefore, sign{det(J2(K
∗
Σ))} = sign{σ¯ − σ}. Then
tr(JΣ(q)) = ρ+
q(ρ+ δ)
2(σ − 1)
,
and
det(JΣ(q)) = −β(1− α)(ρ+ δ)
(
1− q
(
σ¯ − 1
σ − 1
))
.
Thus, tr(JΣ(q)) > 0 for any 0 ≤ q ≤ 1 and det(JΣ(q)) < 0 if σ > σ¯ for any q, and
det(JΣ(q)) ≤ 0 if 1 < σ < σ¯ and 0 ≤ q ≤ q0 where q0 ≡ (σ − 1)/(σ¯ − 1), and det(JΣ(q)) > 0
if 1 < σ < σ¯ and q0 < q ≤ 1. Then the trace and the determinant of the generalized Jacobian
are the sets
tr(J(K∗Σ) =
[
ρ, ρ+
ρ+ δ
2(σ − 1)
]
⊂ R++,
and
det(J(K∗Σ) =
[
det(J1(K
∗
Σ)), det(J1(K
∗
Σ)))
(
σ − σ¯
σ − 1
)]
,
is a subset of R−− if σ > σ¯ and of R if 1 < σ < σ¯. The generalized eigenvalues are
λ∓Σ(q) =
tr(JΣ(q))
2
∓∆(JΣ(q))
1/2, 0 ≤ q ≤ 1,
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where the discriminant is
∆(JΣ(q)) =
1
4
{[
q
2
(
ρ+ δ
σ − 1
)
+ ρ− 2αβ
]2
+ 4(1− α)αβ2
}
,
is positive for any q. Therefore, all the generalized eigenvalues are real and Λ+ is a subset
of R++ and Λ
− is a subset of R−− if σ > σ¯ and of R if σ < σ¯.
Proof of Lemma 7
Proof. If we evaluate equations (32) and (34) we obtain
v1(K˜, C) = v2(K˜, C) = −
α
(
C˜ − C
)
σK˜
,
where ∂
∂K
f1(K˜) =
∂
∂K
f2(K˜) = (1 − 1/σ)F (K˜) − δK˜ − C = C˜ − C. Then v1(K˜)v2(K˜) =(
α
(
C˜ − C
)
/(σK˜)
)2
and v1(K˜, C)v2(K˜, C) > 0 if and only if C 6= C˜. We also obtain the
projection of the two vector fields to the normal of h, v1(K˜, C) > 0 (v1(K˜, C) < 0) if and
only if C > C˜ (C < C˜). The grazing subset of Σ possesses a unique element, a grazing
point, at C = C˜. At this point we have v1(C˜, K˜) = v2(C˜, K˜) = 0. If we evaluate the second
Lie derivative in (35), we obtain
a1(K˜, C˜) = a2(K˜, C˜) =
α(ρ+ δ)C˜
2σK˜


(
φ˜
φ
) 1−α
α
− 1

 .
Therefore, if φ < φ˜ (φ > φ˜ ) then a1(K˜, C˜) > 0 (a1(K˜, C˜) < 0) and grazing occurs from
the side S1 (S2).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. From Lemmas 3 and 4 we already know there is a unique equilibrium steady state
(K∗M , C
∗
M) ∈ S1 that is saddle-point stable. The local dynamics for initial points belonging
to set S1 is similar to the Ramsey model: the isocline C˙ = 0 is vertical, the isocline K˙ = 0,
has slope dC
dK
∣∣
K˙=0
= C
′
1(K
∗
M) = tr(J1(K
∗
M)) = ρ, and the steady-state equilibrium points
are located along the equilibrium radius C∗ = βK∗. The transversality condition (3) is met
if the GE trajectories Φ(t) are tangent to the stable manifold passing through (K∗M , C
∗
M),
W sM =W
s(K∗M , C
∗
M). Locally,W
s
M is tangent to the linear subspace E
s
M , with slope
dC
dK
∣∣
Es
M
=
λ+M > 0. It can be proved that ρ < λ
+
M < β, which implies that the stable manifold W
s
M has
a slope asymptotically verifying the following inequalities
0 <
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
K˙=0
<
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Es
M
<
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
.
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Then, equilibrium trajectories are unique, positively slopped, and are located between the
equilibrium radius C = βK and the isocline K˙ > 0. One implication from this results is that
ifK(0) = K˜ then there is a unique equilibrium value for consumption ΦC(0, K˜). It belongs to
stable manifold, and therefore, should verify βK˜ > ΦC(0, K˜) > (1− 1/σ)F (K˜)− δK˜. If the
initial point belongs to subset S2, K(0) > K˜, and the proof involves non-smooth-dynamics
analysis. As the steady state equilibrium is unique, the GE trajectory starting in branch S2
should reach the switching boundary Σ at time t = tΣ > 0. From Lemma 7 and section 4.2 we
know that if there is continuation to subset S1, then the equilibrium trajectory should cross Σ
with a value for consumption larger than C˜ = Y2(K˜)−δK˜, with both variables decreasing in
time. Therefore the equilibrium trajectory should verify ΦC(t,K(0)) > Φ
g
C(t,K(0)), where
[Φg(t)] is the candidate grazing trajectory that grazes Σ from side S2 and it is tangent to Σ
at the intersection with the isocline K˙ = 0. The equilibrium trajectory has also an upper
bound on S2 given by schedule C = βK. To prove this observe that
dΦcC
dΦcK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
=
βK(R2(K)− (ρ+ δ)
Y2(K)− δK − βK
= αβ <
dC
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= β. (38)
As K˙ < 0 and C˙ < 0 for candidate trajectories verifying ΦcC(t) > Φ
g
C(t), then candidate
trajectories intercept the curve C = βK from below and they diverge from the steady state.
The equilibrium trajectory, converging to the steady state, is the unique candidate trajectory
which cuts that schedule at the equilibrium point. Therefore, the saddle path should lie below
C = βK if K∗M ≤ ΦK(t,K(0)) ≤ K(0) at both branches.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2, mutatis mutandis. In this case,
observe that the unique steady-state equilibrium point is (K∗L, C
∗
L) ∈ S2 and the transver-
sality condition is met if the trajectories, for every admissible initial capital stock K(0),
belong to the stable manifold W sL = W
s(K∗L, C
∗
L), which is also non-smooth and extends to
branches S1 and S2. Asymptotically the GE trajectory converges to the subspace tangent
to the stable manifold in the neighborhood of (K∗L, C
∗
L) ∈ S2, E
s
L, which has again a steeper
slope than the isocline K˙ = 0, but is less steep than the ray C = βK, since
0 <
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
K˙=0
= C
′
2(K
∗
L) = tr(J2(K
∗
L)) <
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Es
L
= λ+L < β,
as we will prove next. An implication is that the equilibrium trajectory traverses Σ below
the isocline K˙ = 0 and both variables are increasing in Σ. As in the last case, equation (38)
is still valid, meaning that candidate trajectories cross the line C = βK with a slope smaller
than β. Again, equilibrium trajectories are the only ones that intercept the line C = βK at
the equilibrium point. This means that, if K(0) ≤ K˜ then βΦK(tΣ, K(0)) < ΦC(tΣ, K(0)) <
Y2(ΦK(tΣ, K(0)))− δΦK(tΣ, K(0)). Thus, equilibrium trajectories starting in S1 should pass
below the grazing trajectory, Φg(t), which in this case grazes Σ from side S1.
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A.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. Proposition 1 presents the number of steady states and the local dynamics for the
case in which 1 < σ < σ¯ and φ < φ < φ˜. There are three equilibria (K∗M , C
∗
M), (K
∗
H , C
∗
H), and
(K∗L, C
∗
L). Geometrically, these equilibria are located in the intersection of the equilibrium
ray C = βK and the isocline K˙ = 0, which is a PWS one-dimensional manifold in (C,K). We
prove below that the equilibrium trajectories, for any initial value of the capital stock belong
to the stable manifolds associated to the two saddle point stable steady states (K∗M , C
∗
M)
and (K∗L, C
∗
L). Those trajectories are located between the two schedules mentioned above,
they are split by steady state (K∗H , C
∗
H), and they are connected to this steady state by two
heteroclinic trajectories, ΓHL and ΓHM . We prove their existence in that order.
First, we prove there is a smooth heteroclinic orbit connecting stationary equilibria
(K∗H , C
∗
H) and (K
∗
L, C
∗
L). We first address local dynamics and the prove there is a connecting
orbit.
Steady state (K∗L, C
∗
L) is saddle-point stable and its Jacobian exhibits eigenvalues λ
−
L <
0 < λ+L . In addition, E
s
L = (λ
+
L , 1)
⊤ is the eigenvector associated to λ−L and E
u
L = (λ
−
L , 1)
⊤ is
the eigenvector associated to λ+L . The stable subspace E
s
L is tangent to the stable manifold
W sL =W
s(K∗L, C
∗
L). Locally, the eigenspaces verify
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= β >
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Es
L
= λ+L >
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
K˙=0
> 0 >
dC(K∗L)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Eu
L
= λ−L ,
since 0 <
dC(K∗
L
)
dK
∣∣∣
K˙=0
= C
′
2(K
∗
L) = tr(J2(K
∗
L)) < λ
+
L < β. Then the eigenspace tangent to
the stable manifold is delimited by lines K˙ = 0 and C = βK. Steady state (K∗H , C
∗
H) is
unstable and its Jacobian has eigenvalues 0 < λ−H < λ
+
H . Furthermore, E
u,+
H = (λ
−
H , 1)
⊤
is the eigenvector associated to λ+H and E
u,−
H = (λ
+
H , 1)
⊤ is the eigenvector associated to
λ−H . They span the subspace tangent to the unstable manifold W
u
H = W
u(K∗H , C
∗
H). In the
neighborhood of (K∗H , C
∗
H) we have
dC(K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
K˙=0
>
dC(K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Eu,−
H
= λ+H >
dC(K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= β >
dC(K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Eu,+
H
= λ−H ,
as 0 < λ−H < β < λ
+
L <
dC(K∗H )
dK
∣∣∣
K˙=0
=tr(J2(K
∗
H)). Then the eigenspace associated to the
smaller eigenvalue in absolute value is also delimited by lines K˙ = 0 and C = βK.
Now consider the global dynamics in the trapping area for K∗H ≤ K ≤ K
∗
L and delimited
by schedules C = βK and C = C2(K) = Y2(K)− δK (i.e. K˙ = 0):
T1 ≡ {(K,C) ∈ S2 : C2(K) ≥ C ≥ βK, K
∗
H ≤ K ≤ K
∗
L}.
The behavior of candidate trajectories in the boundaries of the trapping area are described
next. First, on the first manifold we have
dΦcC(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
= (Y2(K)− δK)(R2(K
∗
H)− (ρ+
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δ)) > 0 and
dΦc
K
(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
= 0. Therefore the slope of the candidate flows in the (K,C)
space is given by
dΦC(t,K)
dΦK(t,K)
∣∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
=∞.
Thus, the dynamic paths point outwards at side K˙ = 0. Second, the candidate flows at
C = βK verify
dΦc
C
(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣
C=βK
= βK(R2(K) − (ρ + δ)) > 0 and
dΦc
K
(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣
C=βK
= Y2(K) −
(β + δ)K > 0. This implies that the slope of the candidate paths verify
dΦcC(t,K)
dΦcK(t,K)
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
=
βK(R2(K)− (ρ+ δ))
(R2(K)− α(β + δ))K/α
= αβ < β =
dC
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
.
Again, as in Proposition 3, candidate trajectories approach the schedule C = βK with a
smaller slope, which means that they move outwards from the trapping area T1. Then, with
the exception of one path that converges to the steady state (K∗L, C
∗
L), all the other candidate
paths starting within the trapping area T1 eventually move outwards. The convergent path
is the equilibrium path, Φ(t). Then the stable manifold W sL has a branch inside the trapping
area T1 and the equilibrium trajectory belonging to it lay along the heteroclinic trajectory,
ΓHL, joining K
∗
H and K
∗
L. The heteroclinic trajectory is tangent to E
u,−
H in the neighborhood
of (K∗H , C
∗
H) and to E
s
L in the neighborhood of (K
∗
L, C
∗
L), which lies within T1, as we have
seen. Geometrically, it separates the paths that start on side C = C2(K) from those leaving
from side C = βK.
Next, we prove that there is a unique PWS heteroclinic orbit connecting both stationary
equilibria, (K∗H , C
∗
H) and (K
∗
M , C
∗
M), and this is an equilibrium trajectory. In order to do
that, we apply the same method used above, but taking into account the non-smoothness
properties of the dynamic system, as two branches (S1 and S2) are crossed. We also define
a trapping area, joining two contiguous subsets belonging to each branch, in which the
dynamics is governed by different equations. For K∗M ≤ K ≤ K˜, then the dynamics is driven
by equations C˙ = C(R1(K)− (ρ+ δ)) and K˙ = Y1(K)− C − δK, and for K˜ ≤ K ≤ K
∗
M ,
it is given by C˙ = C(R2(K) − (ρ + δ)) and K˙ = Y2(K) − C − δK. The trapping area is
delimited by two manifolds, a smooth one C = βK and the non-smooth manifold C = C(K)
where C(K) = Yj(K)− δK for (K,C) ∈ S¯j, j = 1, 2,
T2 ≡ { (K,C) ∈ S¯1 ∪ S¯2 : βK ≥ C ≥ C(K), K
∗
H ≥ K ≥ K
∗
M}.
In Proposition 2 we showed that equilibria (K∗M , C
∗
M) is saddle-point stable and (K
∗
H , C
∗
H)
is a source. The stable manifold associated to (K∗M , C
∗
M), W
s
M , has a tangent, E
s
M , that lies
inside the trapping area due to
0 <
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=C1(K)
= tr(J1(K
∗
M)) <
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Es
M
= λ+M <
dC(K∗M)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= β.
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On the other hand, we showed that the eigenspace associated to the smaller eigenvalue of
the Jacobian J2 evaluated at (K
∗
H , C
∗
H), also lies inside the trapping area, as
dC (K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
= tr(J2(K
∗
H)) >
dC (K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
Eu,−
H
= λ+H >
dC (K∗H)
dK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= β > 0.
This means that the heteroclinic orbit ΓHM should depart from inside the trapping area in
the neighborhood of the MC equilibrium. For K∗M < K < K
∗
H , all candidate trajectories
crossing C = βK point outwards T2, as their slope is smaller in the (K,C) space:
dΦcC
dΦcK
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
=
βK(R1(K)− (ρ+ δ))
Y1(K)− (δ + β)K
=
βK(R2(K)− (ρ+ δ))
Y2(K)− (δ + β)K
= αβ < β,
and
βK˜(Ri(K˜)− (ρ+ δ)) <
dΦcC(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= βK(Ri(K)− (ρ+ δ)) < 0, i = 1, 2,
and
dΦcK(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=βK
= (Ri(K)/α− (δ + β))K < 0, i = 1, 2.
For K∗M < K < K
∗
H , all candidate trajectories crossing C = C(K) also point outwards T2,
as
C1(K
∗
M)(R1(K
∗
M)− (ρ+ δ)) = 0 >
dΦcC(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=C1(K)
= C1(K)(R1(K)− (ρ+ δ)) >
> C1(K˜)(R1(K˜)− (ρ+ δ)),
C2(K˜)(R2(K˜)− (ρ+ δ)) <
dΦcC(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
= C2(K)(R2(K)− (ρ+ δ)) <
< C2(K
∗
H)(R2(K
∗
H)− (ρ+ δ)) = 0,
and
dΦcK(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=C1(K)
=
dΦcK(t,K)
dt
∣∣∣∣
C=C2(K)
= 0.
The later implies that candidate trajectories, not converging to steady-state equilibria, cross
the PWS continuous manifold C = C(K) and head outwards of T2 with slope
dΦcC(t,K)
dΦK(t,K)
∣∣∣∣
C=C(K)
=∞.
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This includes the grazing trajectory, which is tangent to C = C(K) at point K = K˜.
This means that both the heteroclinic ΓHM and the equilibrium trajectories departing from
K˜ < K(0) < K∗H are located between a grazing trajectory departing from (K
∗
H , C
∗
H), which
grazes Σ from the side S2, and the line C = βK cross Σ within the interval (C(K˜, βK˜). This
also implies that they asymptotically converge to the equilibrium point (K∗M , C
∗
M). It can
also be proved that the heteroclinic trajectory is located between the loci Eu,−H and C = βK
(C = C(K) and Eu,−H ) if
K∗
H
−K˜
K˜−K∗
M
−
β−λ+
M
λ+
H
−β
> 0 (< 0).
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Figure 1: Aggregate return and marginal product of capital, and production functions for
σ > σ˜.
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Figure 2: Aggregate return and marginal product of capital, and production functions for
max{σ˜/2, 1} < σ < σ˜.
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Figure 3: Bifurcation diagram for 1 < σ < σ¯ (left panel) and for σ > σ¯ (right panel) with
φ as the bifurcation parameter. Legends: persistence (P), smooth fold bifurcation (F), non-
smooth fold bifurcation (NF). Steady states: saddle point (filled line), unstable steady state
( dashed line).
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Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram in the (σ, φ)-space.
Figure 5: Phase diagram 1 - φ > max{φ˜, φ¯} Unique MC stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 6: Phase diagram 2 - φ < φ˜ Unique CMC stationary equilibrium.
Figure 7: Phase diagram 3 - φ˜ < φ < φ¯ and 1 < σ < σ¯ Multiplicity of stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 8: Bifurcation diagram for 1 < σ < σ¯ (left panel) and for σ > σ¯ (right panel) with
A as the bifurcation parameter. Legends: persistence (P), smooth fold bifurcation (F), non-
smooth fold bifurcation (NF). Steady states: saddle point (filled line), unstable steady state
( dashed line).
Figure 9: Permanent increase in productivity for σ > σ¯.
45
Figure 10: Permanent increase in productivity for 1 < σ < σ¯.
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